The neuroethics of agency: the problem of attributing mental states to people with disorders of consciousness

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.e80043

Resumo

How can we be certain that another creature is a conscious being? One path is to rely on introspective reports we can grasp in communication or observation of their behavior. Another path is to infer mentality and consciousness by means of markers tied to their intentional behavior, that is, agency. In this paper we will argue that even if agency is a marker of consciousness in several normal instances (paradigmatically, for mature and healthy human beings), it is not a good marker in several pathological instances, such as the blindsight case, the vegetative state, the akinetic mutism and the locked-in syndrome. If we are right, this can be of great utility in neuroethics; for those kinds of disorders of consciousness are not, after all, instances of complete absence of consciousness.

Biografia do Autor

Marco Azevedo, UNISINOS

Professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS), São Leopoldo, Rio Grande do Sul (R.S). E-mail: mazevedogtalk@gmail.com

Bianca Andrade, Doutoranda na Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS), São Leopoldo, Rio Grande do Sul (R.S)

Doutoranda na Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS), São Leopoldo, Rio Grande do Sul (R.S). E-mail: biancaandrade@msn.com

Referências

BAYNE, T. Agency as a marker of consciousness. In: CLARK, Andy; KIVERSTEIN, Julian & VIERKANT, Tillmann. Decomposing the will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

BAYNE, T.; SHEA, N. The vegetative state and the science of consciousness. British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 61, 2010: 459-484.

BAYNE, T. HOHWY, J. OWEN. A.M. Are there levels of consciousness? Trends in cognitive sciences, 20(6), 2016.

BERKOWITZ, Aaron L. Lange clinical neurology and neuroanatomy: A Location-based approach. 1st Edition. Kindle Edition. Lange, 2017.

BLOCK. N. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain sciences, 18(2), 1995: 227-287.

BLOCK. N. Consciousness. In: GREGORY, R. Ed. Oxford Companion to the mind. Second Edition, 2004.

BOLY, M. When thoughts become action: An fMRI paradigm to study volitional brain activity in non-communicative brain injured patients. Neuroimage, 36(3), 2007: 979–92.

BURGE, T. Foundations of mind. Philosophical essays. Volume 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.

FRITH, C., PERRY, R., & LUMER, E. The neural correlates of conscious experience: An experimental framework. Trends in the Cognitive Sciences 3, 1999: 105–114.

KLEIN, C. Consciousness, intention, and command following in vegetative state. The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 68(1), 2017: 27-54.

LEVY, N. The value of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 21(1-2), 2014: 127-138. NAGEL, T. What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4, 1974: 435-50.

SCHLOSSER, M. Agency. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/.

WOOLDRIDGE, W. MILLICAN, P. Them and us: Autonomous agents in vivo and in silico. In: BALTAG, A & SMETS, S. (eds.). Johan van Benthem on logic and information dynamics. Outstanding Contributions to Logic 5, Springer-Verlag, 2014.

Downloads

Publicado

2021-04-30

Edição

v. 20 n. 1 (2021): Dossiê Neuroética + Fluxo Contínuo

Seção

Dossiê Neuroética

Licença

Licença Creative Commons
This obra is licensed under a  Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0 Internacional