The moral obligation to be vaccinated: a view from collective consequentialism

Abstract

This article argues for a conditional claim: if collective consequentialism is true, then anyone who is apt to be vaccinated has a moral duty to do so.  Collective consequentialism tells us that an action is morally right if and only if all apt individuals follow the rules in a way that brings about the best consequences. The rule that everyone must get vaccinated has the best upshot, for it will bring about the best consequences if all apt individuals act accordingly. First, I explain what collective consequentialism is and how the view that all apt individuals should get vaccinated hinges on it. Second, I reply to the objection that such a duty would undermine a person’s right to choose not to get vaccinated. I argue that no one has the right to expose others to a possibly harmful outcome. What is more, collective consequentialism says that shared obligations are stronger than alleged individual rights such as that of deciding not to be vaccinated. Finally, I suggest a hypothesis on how we should motivate people to be engaged in their duty to fulfil the collective obligation to be vaccinated; and whether coercion to be vaccinated is plausible on this view.