Normative positivism and the debate that matters
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2022e87383Keywords:
Legal positivism, Law, MoralityAbstract
I argue that the conceptual debate around the positivist thesis of the separability of law and morality is of no practical or theoretical relevance, insofar as, first, the beneficial moral consequences that some positivists have judged to follow from the adoption of the separability thesis may plausibly follow in the same way of its rejection and, second, the data available for the analysis of the legal theorist are in line with both the positivist concept of law and rival concepts, not least because the decision for the data that count is already dependent on the theory we adopt. In other words, I treat the concept of law as an artifact and offer some evidence that nothing of importance depends on exactly how we shape that artifact. After having argued in this sense, I conclude the paper by suggesting that the debate that matters within the scope of analytic theory of law concerns normative positivism as a model of decision prescribed to authorities.
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