Between the useful and the right: Hume, motivation and reasons for being just
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2023.e91159Keywords:
Hume, Justice, Ethics, Motivation, Self-interestAbstract
In this paper, I intend to revisit one of the oldest and most important questions in the history of moral philosophy, namely, what reasons we have to be just. I will address it from the perspective of an interpretive controversy within the framework of David Hume’s moral theory. Two interpretative lines set this debate. The first holds that, for Hume, it is a sufficient condition for us to be just that we are motivated by the appropriate non-moral motives. The second holds that, for Hume, it is a necessary condition for us to be just that we are motivated by the appropriate moral motives. I intend to argue in favor of the first interpretative line by offering a reading that can answer the possible objections that are often raised against this interpretation.
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