Interpretation and authority of law in the work of Joseph Raz
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2022e91873Keywords:
Joseph Raz, Legal interpretation, Authority, Legal positivismAbstract
The aim of this article is to present an analytical reconstruction of the theory of interpretation articulated by Joseph Raz in several of his works. From the distinction between reasoning about law and reasoning from the law, the article articulates the role of interpretation in law, and the reasons that lead lawyers to interpret it. From this, it develops the idea that authority, key to the positivist explanation of the nature of law, also explains, for Raz, the reason why interpretation plays a central role in legal practice. Next, the article explains the idea of ??innovative interpretation, distinguishing it from conservative interpretations, and shows how it explains how judges modify the law – a conceptual necessity derived from the source thesis – without, for that, exercising pure legislative powers. In the end, the paper explains how the authority of law plays a central role in legal interpretation, even when it makes room for other considerations that lead to the modification of law.
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