Allocation of scarce life-saving medical resources: why does age matter?

Autores/as

  • Milene Consenso Tonetto Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, S. C.
  • Luiz Felipe Dossena https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2748-3519

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2023.e97630

Palabras clave:

Age, scarce medical resources, harm of death

Resumen

In this paper, we address the moral justification problem concerning the use of age as a criterion for the allocation of scarce life-saving medical resources. We present and discuss four justifications that stand out in philosophical literature: efficiency, sufficiency, egalitarian, and prioritarian. We aim to demonstrate that all these justifications are unsatisfactory since they entail counterintuitive implications in cases involving fetuses and newborns. We then suggest another justification for the relevance of age based on the Time-Relative Interest Account of the harm of death. Finally, we evaluate an objection that could limit the scope of the defended justification, leading us to draw a distinction between justification of harm and strict justification of harm.

Biografía del autor/a

Milene Consenso Tonetto, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, S. C.

Possui graduação (Bacharelado e Licenciatura) em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (2004), Mestrado (2006) e Doutorado (2010) em Filosofia pela mesma instituição. Em 2009, fez estágio doutoral (sanduíche) na Michigan State University (USA), sob orientação de Frederick Rauscher. Tem experiência na área de Ética e Filosofia Política, atuando principalmente nos seguintes temas: Habermas, ética discursiva, Kant, direitos humanos e fundamentação do direito. Atualmente é editora da revista ethic@

Currículo Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/9485366471180109

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Publicado

2024-03-11

Número

Vol. 22 Núm. 3 (2023): Dossiê: Bioética, Justiça Distributiva e Pandemias

Sección

Dossiê Bioética, Justiça Distributiva e Pandemias

Licencia

Licença Creative Commons
This obra is licensed under a  Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0 Internacional