Responsibility profiles: a note on Adrian Raine

Marcelo Fischborn

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e107648

Autores/as

Marcelo Fischborn Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia Farroupilha https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0410-5251

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e107648

Palabras clave:

Moral Responsibility, Responsibility Profile, Punishment, Free Will

Resumen

At least since the 1970s, there has been an expectation that results from cognitive neuroscience will eventually impact the practices associated with the concept of moral responsibility. Those practices include expressions of blame and the institution of legal punishment. The standard approach to those changes appeals to skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. However, that approach faces a major challenge: the persistence of beliefs and attitudes about free will, moral responsibility, and the appropriateness of punishing wrongdoers. This paper seeks to develop an alternative approach, based on the concept of a responsibility profile. Empirical work, such as Adrian Raine’s, has shown that individuals vary in how they react to being held responsible. Those variations may help to inform the proposal and assessment of better ways of implementing the practices associated with moral responsibility in ways that do not require skepticism.

Citas

Bigenwald, A.; Chambon, V. 2019. Criminal Responsibility and Neuroscience: No Revolution Yet. Frontiers in Psychology 10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01406

Clark, C. J.; Luguri, J. B.; Ditto, P. H.; Knobe, J.; Shariff, A. F.; Baumeister, R. F. 2014. Free to Punish: A Motivated Account of Free Will Belief. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 106(4): 501–513.

Fischborn, M. 2018. How Should Free Will Skeptics Pursue Legal Change?. Neuroethics 11(1): 47–54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-017-9333-8

Fischborn, M. 2023. The Evolutionary Roots of Moral Responsibility. Philosophy of Science 90(4): 817–835. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.60

Fischborn, M. 2024. Reforming responsibility practices without skepticism. Philosophical Psychology 37(4): 904–920. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2090913

Fischer, J. M. 2023. Review of Review of Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will, by R. M. Sapolsky. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/determined-a-science-of-life-without-free-will/

Greene, J.; Cohen, J. 2004. For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 359: 1775–1785.

Jean-Richard-Dit-Bressel, P., Killcross, S., & McNally, G. P. 2018. Behavioral and neurobiological mechanisms of punishment: Implications for psychiatric disorders. Neuropsychopharmacology 43(8): 1639–1650. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41386-018-0047-3

Libet, B. 1999. Do We Have Free Will?. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(8–9): 47–57.

Libet, B.; Gleason, C. A.; Wright, E. W.; Pearl, D. K. 1983. Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act. Brain 106(3): 623–642.

Mameli, M. 2013. Meat made us moral: A hypothesis on the nature and evolution of moral judgment. Biology & Philosophy 28(6): 903–931. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9401-3

Mele, A. 2009. Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mele, A. 2013. Free Will, Science, and Punishment. In: T.A. Nadelhoffer (ed.), The Future of Punishment, p.177–191. New York: Oxford University Press.

Morris, N.; Rothman, D. J. 1995. Introduction. In: N. Morris & D. J. Rothman (eds.), The Oxford History of the Prison, p. vii–xiv. New York: Oxford University Press.

Raine, A. 2013. The Anatomy of Violence: The Biological Roots of Crime. New York: Pantheon Books.

Rolls, E. T. 2000. The orbitofrontal cortex and reward. Cerebral Cortex 10(3): 284–294. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/10.3.284

Sapolsky, R. M. 2024. Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will. Penguin Press.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W.; Nadel, L. (eds.). 2011. Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. New York: Oxford University Press.

Spitzley, J. 2021. The Future of Moral Responsibility and Desert. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 12(4): 977–997. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00522-5

Strawson, P. F. 2009 [1962]. Freedom and Resentment. In: D. Pereboom (ed.), Free Will, p.148–171. Indianapolis: Hackett.