On Causality and Necessity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e109665Keywords:
Causality, Causal Realism, Simultaneous Causality, Sequential Causality, Causal Necessity, Causal Production, Causal ProcessesAbstract
In this paper I present an argument for causal necessity. Firstly, I introduce the theoretical background about necessary connections and discuss some of the senses of necessitation that can be found in the literature. After inconsistencies are detected in each of them, I develop an additional sense from one of the previous contributions: causal necessity is to be explained by causal production and simultaneous causality. Secondly, I present the contemporary conception of causality in metaphysics, which I call the received view. The received view has as two of its tenets an event ontology and a sequential approach to the structure of causality. Sequential causality is submitted to a recently developed counterargument to stress its untenability. Thirdly, I explore an alternative to sequential causality: simultaneous causality. I expand the argument against sequential causality and show how simultaneous causality entails causal necessity. Fourthly, I consider some potential replies to the argument presented. Finally, some further considerations are drawn.
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