Sense data and the philosophy of mind: Russell, James, and Mach

Gary Hatfield

Abstract


The theory of knowledge in early twentieth-century Anglo American philosophy was oriented toward phenomenally described cognition There was a healthy respect for the mind body problem, which meant that phenomena in both the mental and physical domain were taken sinuously Bertrand Russell's developing position on sense-data and momentary particulars drew upon, and ultimately became like, the neutral monism of Ernst Mach and William James Due to a more recent behaviorist and physicalist inspired "fear of the mental", this development has been down played in historical work on early analytic philosophy Such neglect as sumes that the "linguistic turn" is a proper and permanent effect of twentieth century philosophy, an assumption that distorts early analytic historiography, and begs a substantive philosophical question about thought and cognition.

Keywords


Epistemology; mind-body problem; neutral monism; perception; psychology; sense-data



DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

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Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
Published by NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC
Center of Philosophy and Human Sciences – CFH
Campus Reitor João David Ferreira Lima
Florianópolis, Santa Catarina - Brazil
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 ISSN: 1414-4217
EISSN: 1808-171

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