Reliability in Plantinga´s Account of Epistemic Warrant
In das paper 1 consider the reliability condition in Alvin Platinga’s proper functionalist account of epistemic warrant I begin by reviewing m some detail the features of the reliability condition as Platinga has articulated a From there, 1 consider what is needed to ground or secure the sort of reliability which Plantinga has m mind, and argue that what is needed is a significant causal condition which has generally been overlooked Then, after identifying eight versions of the relevant sort of reliability, I exam me each alternative as to whether as requirement, along with Platinga’s other proposed conditions, would give us a satisfactory account of epistemic warrant I conclude that there is bale to no hope of formulating a reliability condition that would yield a satisfactory analysts of the sort Plantinga desires
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