Sosa, DeRose y las creencias seguras

Authors

  • Ignacio Vilaró UNAM

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n1p135

Abstract

According to Sosa, in order for a truthful belief to count as knowledge it must be safe (a modal notion which is similar, although not identical, to that of sensitivity). An alleged advantage of this condition of safety, over that of sensitivity, has to do with its capacity to provide a Moorean response to the skeptical Cartesian. DeRose criticizes safety both from a pragmatic and a semantic point of view. I present a slightly different version of his critique putting aside some incidental issues and clarifying what is at stake in his main charge. Sosa’s response is inadequate because it deals only with peripheral aspects.

Published

2014-05-01

Issue

Section

Articles