Algumas razões para levar a sério a metaindução pessimista

Tiago Luís Teixeira Oliveira

Abstract


The present paper aims to give an account of pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) and reply to some representative realist authors who want to consider PMI a fallacy. Most of that accounts are misinterpretations of Laudant’s ideas and fails the target. This work intend that PMI is neither a induction nor a reductio, but a skeptic challenge. If this is right then PMI could not be a fallacy and the realism cannot escape from the task of explain why the success is a good indication for the truthlikeness of the current theories.


Keywords


Pessimistic induction; realism; anti-realism; Laudan; Psillos



DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n2p269

Copyright (c) 2014

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Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
Published by NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC
Center of Philosophy and Human Sciences – CFH
Campus Reitor João David Ferreira Lima
Florianópolis, Santa Catarina - Brazil
CEP: 88040-900

 ISSN: 1414-4217
EISSN: 1808-171

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