As concepções brentaniana e neo-brentaniana dos objetos das sensações

Arthur Octavio de Melo Araujo

Abstract


The paper proposes an analysis of the Bretanian conception of the objects of sensations and a review of the neo-Brentanian literature on this theme. Starting from the Brentanian thesis that all mental phenomena are intentional, it intends to analyze if the objects of sensations would have the same intentional property. This is also an issue on the meaning and the home of the objects of sensations. From the analysis of the Brentanian thesis, in parallel, the paper seeks to identify the extent and the limit of a representationalist perspective in Philosophy of Mind. Finally, it indicates a form of adverbialism as a possible alternative to a representationalist view on the objects of sensations.


Keywords


As concepções brentaniana e neo-brentaniana dos objetos das sensações



DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n3p337

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Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
Published by NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC
Center of Philosophy and Human Sciences – CFH
Campus Reitor João David Ferreira Lima
Florianópolis, Santa Catarina - Brazil
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 ISSN: 1414-4217
EISSN: 1808-171

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