Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue

Authors

  • Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo Doutorando em Filosofia pela UFSC

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33

Abstract

Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.

Author Biography

Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo, Doutorando em Filosofia pela UFSC

Doutorando em filosofia pela UFSC

Published

2015-04-30

Issue

Section

Articles