Indução, confiabilidade e predicados do tipo verdul

Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33

Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue

Authors

Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo Doutorando em Filosofia pela UFSC

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33

Abstract

Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.