Sorte, virtude, e anulabilidade epistêmica

Authors

  • João Rizzio Vicente Fett Departamento de Filosofia Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p179

Abstract

Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature. Pritchard holds that his anti-luck virtue epistemology puts together the correct intuitions from both anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology and avoids their problems. Contra Pritchard, we believe that there is already a satisfactory theory on offer, namely, the defeasibility theory of knowledge. In this essay we intend (i) to examine Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and (ii) to defend the defeasibility theory of knowledge as an alternative to Pritchard’s theory. We will provide the reader with reasons for believing that the defeasibility theory is better than Pritchard’s theory because the former is more economic and more ecumenical than the latter, since it goes without non-epistemic notions and remains neutral as for the internalism vs. externalism debate.

Author Biography

João Rizzio Vicente Fett, Departamento de Filosofia Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)

Departamento de Filosofia

Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)

Published

2016-05-23

Issue

Section

Articles