Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas

Juan Manuel Duran

Abstract


In this article I propose an analysis of two opposing viewpoints on the notion of computer simulation. The first one, proposed by Stephan Hartmann, has been adopted by philosophers who believe that computer simulations can be understood by means of a familiar philosophy, such as a philosophy of scientific models or a philosophy of scientific experimentation. The second notion belongs to Paul Humphreys, who suggests that computer simulations are objects of genuine philosophical interest, and that understanding their nature allows us to understand their role in current scientific practice.

Keywords


Computer simulations; scientific models; computational templates



DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125

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Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
Published by NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC
Center of Philosophy and Human Sciences – CFH
Campus Reitor João David Ferreira Lima
Florianópolis, Santa Catarina - Brazil
CEP: 88040-900

 ISSN: 1414-4217
EISSN: 1808-171

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