The Contingent Unknowability of Facts and its Relation with Informal, Epistemological Contexts




This paper focuses on elements that are involved in a specific type of judgment, namely, those involving facts that, in virtue of contingent reasons, are out of our epistemic reach. Its goal is to propose a philosophical explanation about why we, in informal contexts, take some facts as contingently unknowable. In order to accomplish that goal, we develop a theory that defines contingently unknowable facts in a very specific way. We establish three clauses that are jointly necessary and sufficient — so we argue — for taking an arbitrary fact as contingently unknowable. In a variety of contexts, this strategy has the potential of reducing efforts in an epistemological analysis of this particular type of unknowability.

Author Biography

Stanley Kreiter Bezerra Medeiros, IFRN - Instituto Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

Possui graduação em filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (2005) e mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal da Paraíba (2008). Doutorado em Filosofia pelo Programa Integrado de Doutorado em Filosofia - UFRN-UFPB-UFPE. Tem experiência na área de Filosofia, com ênfase em Lógica e Epistemologia. Atualmente, dedica-se ao estudo da lógica informal, argumentação e pensamento crítico.