The Scope of the Construction of Experience in Empiricist Structuralism

Nelida Gentile

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p445

Authors

Nelida Gentile University of Buenos Aires National University of Lomas de Zamora

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p445

Abstract

In his attempt to put forward an empiricist version of structuralism, van Fraassen develops an approach to scientific representation and models which has been the object of several critiques. Here we cover the “Loss of Reality Objection”, namely, that reality itself would play no role in science if science could only refer to mathematical models. We examine and dismiss the solution offered by van Fraassen. Finally, we offer an alternative solution path.

Author Biography

Nelida Gentile, University of Buenos Aires National University of Lomas de Zamora

Doctora en Filosofía por la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Profesora Titular Regular de Introducción al Pensamiento Científico en el Ciclo Básico Común (UBA) y Profesora Adjunta Regular de Filosofía de la Ciencia en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras (UBA).