Inconsistency, Paraconsistency and ω-Inconsistency

Authors

  • Bruno Da Ré Universidad de Buenos Aires.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p171

Abstract

In this paper I’ll explore the relation between ω-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I’ll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting feature of being able to handle semantic and arithmetic concepts, maintaining the standard model. However, it can be easily shown that both theories are ω- inconsistent. Although usually a theory of truth is generally expected to be ω-consistent, all conceptual concerns don’t apply to inconsistent theories. Finally, I’ll explore if it’s possible to have an inconsistent, butω-consistent theory of truth, restricting my analysis to substructural theories.

Author Biography

Bruno Da Ré, Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Universidad de Buenos Aires - IIF-CONICET.

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Published

2018-08-22

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Section

Articles