A quasi-regularist view of laws

Nélida Gentile


It will be analyzed some views about laws and highlight certain aspects in each of them that, in our opinion, are to the detriment of their plausibility. The views that we will analyze are the standard regularist conception and the most sophisticated variant known as the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis (MRL) approach, on the one hand, and the necessitarianist versions of David Armstrong and Stephen Mumford, on the other. Finally, we present an alternative proposal that is intermediate between the regularist conception and Mumford’s nomological anti-realism. We believe that our proposal successfully avoids the reviewed difficulties and opens a new theoretical space within the dispute over the laws of nature.


Scientific laws; Laws of nature; Necesitarism; Regularism; Quasi-regularism

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p445

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Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
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