Believing that P requires taking it to be the case that P: a reply to Grzankowski and Sankey
In a recent paper in this journal, Alex Grzankowski argues, contra Howard Sankey, that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true. In this short reply, I’ll agree with Grzankowski that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true, and I’ll argue that Sankey’s recent response to Grzankowski is inadequate as it stands. However, it’ll be my contention that Grzankowski’s argument doesn’t demonstrate that believing that p doesn’t require taking it to be the case that p.
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