Considerations on perception from the enactive perspective




This article reviews the enactive approach to perception, which defends the role of objects, the subject and the environment in the configuration of the phenomenal character of perception, that is, the qualitative dimension of experience. Initially the case of hallucination and its implications in the understanding of the phenomenal character of perception is retaken. Then, two positions within analytic philosophy of perception, representationalism and disjunctivism, are critically explored. Finally, enactivism is presented as a more promising alternative.

Author Biography

Ana Lorena Dominguez Rojas, Catholic University of Pereira

Psychology program
Full-time teacher


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