What makes a possible world physycally possible?


  • Manuel Jesús Herrera Aros Universidad de Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA
  • Cristián Ariel López Universite de Lausanne, Universidad de Buenos Aires, CONICET, ARGENTINA




There is a widely extended viewpoint about physical possibility, what we will call Standard Approach, which holds that the physically possible is delimited by the nomological structure of physical theories: to be physically possible is to be in accordance with the physical laws, to be physically impossible is to be prohibited by physical laws and to be physically necessary is to be demanded by the physical laws. However, it is possible to show that this approach is too relaxed and permissive when it comes to collecting and systematizing many of the modal intuitions present in the physical community. In this work we will argue, on the one hand, that the notion of physical possibility is more complex and richer than suggested by the standard approach and, on the other hand, that it is necessary to add some extra elements to the characterization of physical possibility in order to that it is adequate in scientific contexts.

Author Biographies

Manuel Jesús Herrera Aros, Universidad de Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA

Universidad de Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA

Cristián Ariel López, Universite de Lausanne, Universidad de Buenos Aires, CONICET, ARGENTINA

Universite de Lausanne, Universidad de Buenos Aires, CONICET, ARGENTINA


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