A contextualist approach to emergence
What is exactly the emergence relation? In which sense is irreducibility associated with it besides being assumed by definition? Although in many cases the explanatory role of emergent states does not exceed the explanatory role of more basic states, this does not speak against the fact that, for some relevant explanatory contexts, emergent states are irreducible. On this basis, an epistemic concept of the emergence relation that does not depend strictly on irreducibility is here offered.
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