Logic, planning agency and branching time

Ricardo Souza Silvestre

Abstract


The purpose of this paper is to give a formal account of a kind of agency so far neglected in the field of philosophical modal logic of action: planning agency. In doing this we follow the standard approach of modal logics of agency exemplified by the works of Belnap, Chellas and Pörn. Since we believe there is a close relation between planning, time and indeterminism, we use the theory of branching time as a conceptual framework for investigating the basic features of planning agency. Besides introducing a branching-time semantics, we also provide a calculus sound and complete with respect to this semantics.

DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p421


Keywords


Modal logic of action; planning agency; branching time theory



DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p421

Copyright (c)

 http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/public/site/images/jconte/logo-nel1_154

Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
Published by NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC
Center of Philosophy and Human Sciences – CFH
Campus Reitor João David Ferreira Lima
Florianópolis, Santa Catarina - Brazil
CEP: 88040-900

 ISSN: 1414-4217
EISSN: 1808-171

e-mail: principia@contato.ufsc.br