Epistemic Duties and Failure to Understand one's Evidence

Scott Stapleford

Abstract


http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p147

 

The paper defends the thesis that our epistemic duty is the duty to proportion our beliefs to the evidence we possess. An inclusive view of evidenced possessed is put forward on the grounds that it makes sense of our intuitions about when it is right to say that a person ought to believe some proposition P. A second thesis is that we have no epistemic duty to adopt any particular doxastic attitudes. The apparent tension between the two theses is resolved by applying the concept of duty to belief indirectly.


Keywords


Epistemic duties; ethics of belief; doxastic voluntarism; evidence; evidentialism; R. Feldman.



DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p147

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Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
Published by NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC
Center of Philosophy and Human Sciences – CFH
Campus Reitor João David Ferreira Lima
Florianópolis, Santa Catarina - Brazil
CEP: 88040-900

 ISSN: 1414-4217
EISSN: 1808-171

e-mail: principia@contato.ufsc.br