Four theses of underdetermination of theories by observational evidence: meanings, plausibilities and implications




This paper singles out and analyzes four theses of underdetermination of scien-tific theories by observational evidence, showing that each has its own meaning, plausibility,and implications. We show that the strongest theses are nothing but conjectures, whereasthe weaker ones are more plausible but do not carry with them robust philosophical conse-quences — such as scientific anti-realism — although they do provide evidence of systemat-ically unknown theoretical alternatives in science, as well as indirect evidence of the use ofvalue-laden criteria of theory choice.

Author Biographies

Guilherme Gräf Schüler, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Departamento de Filosofia - discente de graduação

Rogério P. Severo, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Professor do Departamento de Filosofia da UFRGS.


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