Disclaiming epistemic Akrasia: arguments and commentaries
In many ways one’s quest for knowledge can go wrong. Since the publication ofAmélie Rorty’s article “Akratic Believers”, in 1983, there has been a great deal of discussion asto one particular form of flaw in reasoning to which we, as less-than-perfect rational entities,are continuously prone to in our epistemic endeavors: “epistemicakrasia” (an analog, withintheoretical reason, of the weakness of will that is commonly thought to affect practical rea-son). The debate that article gave rise became, then, split between authors to whom the ideaof epistemicakrasiapromotes an interesting diagnosis of some of our intellectual imperfec-tions, and their opponents, those who disclaim the very possibility of the phenomenon. Inthis paper I’ll examine, and present original objections to, four of the main arguments put for-ward by the latter, showing that none of them have consistently ruled out all the legitimatelyconceivable forms of the phenomenon.
Adler, J. (2002a). Akratic Believing? Philosophical Studies, 110: 1-27.
Adler, J. (2002b). Belief's Own Ethics. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Alston, W. (1989). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell UP, pp. 115-52.
Bratman, M. (1999). Practical Reason and Acceptance in a Context. Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-34.
Buckareff, A. (2004). Acceptance and Deciding to Believe. Journal of Philosophical Research, 29: 173-90.
Cohen, J. (1989). Belief and Acceptance. Mind, 98: 367-89
Cohen, J. (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coates, A. (2012). Rational Epistemic Akrasia. American Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 113-124.
Davidson, D. (1970). Events and Particulars. Noûs 4: 25-32.
Davidson, D. (1980). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 21-42.
Davidson, D. (1986). A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In: E. LePore (ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Blackwell’s: 307–319.
Davidson, D. (1999). The Emergence of Thought. Animal Mind, 51: 7–17.
Dretske, F. (1971). Reasons, Knowledge and Probability. Philosophy of Science. 38: 216-20.
Ginet, C. (2001). Deciding to Believe. In: M. Steup (ed.) Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 63–76.
Hare, R. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford Clarendon Press.
Harman, G. (1980). Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 165-182.
Heil, J. (1983). Doxastic Agency. Philosophical Studies, 43: 355-64.
Hookway, C. (2001). Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue. In: A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski (eds.) Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 178-199.
Hurley, S. (1989). Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. New York: Oxford University Press.
Johnston, M. (1995). Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind. In: C. MacDonald and G. MacDonald (eds.) Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
Kampa, S. (2019). Obsessive-Compulsive Akrasia. Mind & Language, 1:1–18.
Klein, P. (1981). Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Mele, A. (1986). Incontinent Believing. The Philosophical Quarterly, 36: 212-222
Mele, A. (1992). Acting for Reasons and Acting Intentionaly. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 73: 355-374.
Montmarquet, J. (1987). Epistemic Virtue. Mind, 96: 482–97
Owens, D. (2000). Reason without Freedom. London: Routledge, 2000.
Owens, D. (2002). Epistemic Akrasia. The Monist, 85: 381-97.
Owens, D. (2003). Does Belief Have An Aim? Philosophical Studies, 115: 275-97.
Petit, P; Smith, M (1996). Freedom in Belief and Desire. Journal of Philosophy, 93: 429-49.
Raz, J. (2007). Reasons: Explanatory and Normative. Oxford Legal Studies, 1: 1-25.
Ribeiro, B. (2011). Epistemic Akrasia. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 1: 18-25.
Rorty, A. (1981). Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. University of California Press.
Rorty, A. (1983). Akratic Believers. American Philosophical Quarterly, 20: 175-83.
Shah, N. (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review, 112: 447-482.
Shah, N. and Velleman, D. (2005) Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review, 114: 497-534.
de Sousa, R. (1987). The Rationality of Emotion. MIT Press.
Steup, M. (2000). Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology. Acta Analytica, 15: 25-56.
Vahid, H. (2006). Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies, 131: 303-335.
Velleman, J. (2000). On the Aim of Belief. In: The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Weatherson, B. (2008). Deontology and Descartes’ Demon. Journal of Philosophy, 105: 540-69.
Wedgewood, R. (2012). Justified Inference. Synthese, 189: 273-295.
Whiting, D. (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 279-300.
Wiggins, D. (1987). A Sensible Subjectivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, B. (1970). Deciding to Believe. In H. E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz (eds.) Language, Belief, and Metaphysics. Albany: Suny Press, pp. 95-111.
Williams, B. (1973). Ethical Consistency. Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, S. (1990). Belief, Desire and the Praxis of Reasoning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. XC: 119-42.
Winters, B. (1979). Believing at Will. Journal of Philosophy, 76: 243-56.
Woffinden B. (1988). Miscarriages of Justice. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Zalabardo, J. (2010). Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief. Philosophical Explorations, 13: 1-21.
Copyright (c) 2021 Veronica S. Campos
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Principia http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/index is licenced under a Creative Commons - Atribuição-Uso Não-Comercial-Não a obras derivadas 3.0 Unported.
Base available in www.periodicos.ufsc.br.