What ignorance could not be

Ekaterina Kubyshkina; Mattia Petrolo

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p247

Authors

Ekaterina Kubyshkina
Mattia Petrolo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p247

Abstract

In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance. The Standard View defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the New View defines it as the absence of true belief. We argue that both views provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for ignorance, and thus do not constitute satisfactory definitions for such a notion.

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