La Actitud de La Obra de Arte


  • Malena León Instituto de Humanidades (CONICET)



We aim to develop a take on the meaning of works of art that builds on Dennett's view on the nature of intentionality, namely, that the intentionality exhibited by mental phenomena is not original, but derived. Regarding the meaning of works of art, theories that hold that the meaning is determined by the intentions of the author when creating the work are considered intentionalist. Adopting the view of derived intentionality implies that it is no longer possible to maintain that the semantic content of a work of art is closely linked to the creative act that gave rise to it; accordingly, intentionalist theories should be, broadly speaking, abandoned. However, we claim that one aspect of intentionalist theories is accurate and, moreover, compatible with the perspective on intentionality we adopt: The fact that part of the meaning of a work of art is given by the interpretations that arise when it is assumed that the work was produced by an agent with the purpose of transmitting something. We call this interpretative strategy the work-of-art stance and argue that it should be understood as a subtype of the intentional stance. According to our proposal, this interpretive strategy is part of a view that tries to explain the meaning of works of art as partially indeterminate, relative to a history (and not to a foundational origin) and dependent on interpretive attribution. 

Author Biography

Malena León, Instituto de Humanidades (CONICET)

Lic. en Filosofía por la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina. Actualmente se encuentra realizando un Doctorado en Filosofía en la misma Universidad, gracias a una beca doctoral otorgada por CONICET.


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