Logical theory revision through data underdetermination: an anti-exceptionalist exercise
The anti-exceptionalist debate brought into play the problem of what are the relevant data for logical theories and how such data affects the validities accepted by a logical theory. In the present paper, I depart from Laudan's reticulated model of science to analyze one aspect of this problem, namely of the role of logical data within the process of revision of logical theories. For this, I argue that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several distinct methodologies for logical theories. The resulting picture is coherent with the Laudanean view that agreement and disagreement between scientific theories take place at different levels. From this perspective, one is able to articulate other kinds of divergence that considers not only the inferential aspects of a given logical theory, but also the epistemic aims and the methodological choices that drive its development.
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