Taking models seriously and being a linguistic realist

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo; Gilson Olegario da Silva

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84309

Authors

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo State University of Campinas/FAPESP https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3800-8505
Gilson Olegario da Silva Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, BRAZIL

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84309

Keywords:

Anti-realism, linguistic framework, metaontology, scientific realism, wave function realism

Abstract

Carnap’s conception of linguistic frameworks is widespread; however, it is not entirely clear nor consensual to pinpoint what is the influence in his stance within the traditional realist/anti-realist debate. In this paper, we place Carnap as a proponent of a scientific realist stance, by presenting what he called “linguistic realism”. Some possible criticisms are considered, and a case study is offered with wave function realism, a popular position in the philosophy of quantum mechanics.

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