Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism

Wilson Mendonça; Julia Telles de Menezes

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067

Authors

Wilson Mendonça Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
Julia Telles de Menezes Universidade Federal Fluminense

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067

Keywords:

Epistemic possibilities, Intensions, Metaphysical plenitude, Metaphysical possibilities, Strong necessities

Abstract

Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive.

Author Biography

Wilson Mendonça, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Graduação em Engenharia Eletrônica pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (1973). Mestrado em Filosofia pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (1980). Doutorado em Filosofia pela Universidade de Konstanz (1986). Professor Titular de Filosofia na Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Publicações nas áreas de filosofia da mente, filosofia moral e metaética.

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