Knowledge from Falsehood: An Objection to Borges’ Concessive Proposal
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2024.e91411Keywords:
Knowledge from falsehood, Concessive proposal, Rodrigo Borges, InferenceAbstract
Rodrigo Borges (2020, 2017) argues that the epistemic status of target-belief p does not depend on a false belief in cases of knowledge from falsehood, even though that belief is a case of knowledge. The goal of this paper is to scrutinize this claim. In order to do so, I will start explaining what the problem of knowledge from falsehood is about and I will explain the concessive proposal developed by Rodrigo Borges in the second section. Lastly, I will argue that this proposal does not fit correctly because there are supposedly some cases of knowledge from falsehood in which the known conclusion depends on a false belief.
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