On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e92106Keywords:
Paradoxes, Predicates, Non-Classical Logic, Logical Validity, Philosophy of LogicAbstract
Many semantic theories become trivial when extended with a naïve validity predicate due to the validity paradoxes. The non-classical semantic theories are the ones that allegedly preserve the naïveté of the validity predicate while being capable of avoiding the validity paradoxes. This blocking, on the other hand, usually comes at a high cost. In this paper, we argue that the pre-theoretical notion of validity that the naïve validity predicate intends to capture is unattainable.
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