Non-causal laws: an alternative hypothesis to Armstrong’s hypothesis

Eduardo Castro

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e96270

Authors

Eduardo Castro University of Beira Interior https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4830-1676

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e96270

Keywords:

David Armstrong, Laws of Nature, Metaphysics, Functional Laws, Supervenience

Abstract

Non-causal laws have long been a thorn in David Armstrong’s side. This paper aims to provide a more accommodating framework for these laws within Armstrong’s metaphysics of laws of nature. Armstrong proposed the hypothesis that non-causal laws supervene upon causal laws. In this paper, I present arguments against Armstrong’s hypothesis and propose an alternative hypothesis: non-causal laws are fundamental laws, not supervenient upon causal laws. Additionally, as some non-causal laws are functional laws, this paper will also delve into characterising the nature of functional laws. Finally, I will demonstrate how my conception of non-causal laws solves the identification problem posed by Bas van Fraassen.

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