Computadora humana e hipercomputabilidad relativista: una discusión de la Tesis de Turing física

Carlos Villacís

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e96501

Autores

Carlos Villacís Universidad Complutense de Madrid https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2339-4463

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e96501

Palavras-chave:

Máquina de Turing, Computadora Humana, Tesis de Turing Física, Hipercomputabilidad, Hipercomputadora Relativista

Resumo

La Tesis de Turing establece que las funciones efectivamente computables son Turing-computables o computables por alguna máquina de Turing. De modo análogo, la Tesis de Turing física establece que toda función físicamente computable es Turing-computable. Esta tesis involucra una noción de computación física distinta de la versión matemática de la definición de computación. En primer lugar, discutimos la distinción a partir de la condición del vehículo independiente del medio y de la idea de la computadora humana de Turing. En segundo lugar, discutimos la Tesis de Turing física a partir del experimento mental de Andréka et al. (2018) en el que se puede construir una hipercomputadora relativista operando en el contexto de un agujero negro en rotación lenta. Con ello obtenemos un contraejemplo a la Tesis de Turing física puesto que existiría una computadora capaz de computar físicamente funciones no Turing-computables.

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