The argument from undecidable dissension

Hugo Enrique Sánchez López

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2024.e96709

Authors

Hugo Enrique Sánchez López Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México https://orcid.org/0009-0002-2277-1124

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2024.e96709

Keywords:

Dissension, Equipollence, Principles of rationality, Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Suspension of judgment, Epistemic arbitrariness

Abstract

The five modes of suspension of judgment outlined by Sextus Empiricus (HP XV 164-188) coordinate a complex argumentative strategy to prompt the general suspension of judgment. But modes (τρόπος) are general argument forms that can be deployed individually against the dogmatist, who is willing to accept that a certain answer to a question establishes how things really are. In this case, the aim of the modes is not the general suspension of judgment but the continuation of the investigation. I present a deductive version of the mode of undecidable dissension that pinpoints some principles and assumptions the skeptics requires to run their arguments.

References

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