What can we do in Philosophy using Frege’s and Kripke’s logics?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2024.e96710Keywords:
Ineffable, Nonsense, Rigid designator, Quotation, Frege, KripkeAbstract
In this article I issue a challenge to philosophers engaged in constructing logical languages. Formal languages that have had a great influence on various areas of philosophy have ineffable statements that arise from metaphysical assumptions, thus limiting what we can do with them. I deal with two cases. The case of Frege known as “The paradox of the concept horse”, and that of Kripke that is not as famous as the Fregean problem, which I call “The necessary bearing of the name.” I briefly develop each case and show that together they give us sufficient evidence of the limits of what we can do with logic when the formal systems employ unexamined metaphysical assumptions.
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