A note on Mcgee’s counterexample to Modus Ponens

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2024.e96728

Palavras-chave:

Modus Ponens, Counterexample, Indicative Conditionals, Conditionals, Existential quantification

Resumo

In this article I will review McGee's famous counterexample to Modus Ponens and I will argue that it is not a real counterexample. I will claim that the problem lies in an infelicitous assertion of the second premise. As result of this diagnosis, I will suggest that when dealing with indicative conditionals a pragmatic theory is needed.

Referências

Adams, E. 1965. The logic of conditionals. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 8(1-4):166 – 197. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201746508601430

Bennett, J. 2003. A Philosophical Guide to Conditional, Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199258872.001.0001

Edgington, D. 1995. On conditionals. Mind, 104(414):235-329. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/104.414.235

Fulda, J. S. 2010. Vann McGee’s counterexample to Modus Ponens: An enthymeme. Journal of Pragmatics, 42(1): 271-273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2009.05.016

Katz, B. D. 1999. On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy, 96(8): 404. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564629

Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

McGee, V. 1985. A Counterexample to Modus Ponens, Journal of Philosophy, 82: 462-471. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026276

Piller, Ch. 1996. Vann McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens. Philosophical Studies, 82 (1):27-54. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355293

Sinnott-Armstrong, W.; Moor, J.; Fogelin, R. 1986. A Defense of Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy, 83: 296-300. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026144

Publicado

2024-07-10

Edição

Seção

What Can We Do in Philosophy Using Logic?