Gettier Cases – Are They Really Proper Counterexamples?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e97234Keywords:
Gettier Problem, Gettier Cases, Gettier Cases Taxonomy, Epistemic LuckAbstract
Since the appearing of Gettier’s counterexamples to the traditional definition of knowledge, in 1963, a bunch of new cases has been presented in order to show that there are many scenarios where a subject has justified belief but true by luck, in such cases that belief cannot be properly classified as knowledge. In this paper I will try to show that there are so many putative Gettier cases that ultimately fails to be counted as proper counterexamples – i.e., they are not cases of justified belief luckily true. I will assume Blouw, Buckwater and Turri’s taxonomy of Gettier cases (2017), and then I’ll argue that its main categories are constituted by unproblematic cases. Just one category – the category of fake barns cases – constitutes one of proper counterexamples, or so I will argue.
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