Substances or Processes? On Processualism in Metaphysics of Biology

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e98276

Keywords:

Organism, Process, Substance, Life, Biological Individual

Abstract

Several philosophers have been advancing a metaphysics for biological entities that refuses to conceive them in terms of the category of ‘object’ or ‘substance’ but, instead, appeals to the category of ‘process’. They have contended that a process metaphysics is more adequate to understand the continuous metabolic flux of matter and energy in the living realm, as well as the variations through life cycles. It is argued in this work that the biological facts that have motivated the processual perspective can be perfectly accommodated in a substance metaphysics according to which biological organism have an essence determined by its sortal properties that have a ‘regulative’ function over its temporal and modal conditions of identity.

Author Biography

José Tomás Alvarado Marambio, Universidad de Los Andes

Instituto de Filosofía Universidad de los Andes Av. Monseñor Álvaro del Portillo 12455 Las Condes - Santiago 7620086 Chile

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Published

2025-10-24

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Section

Articles