The equilibrium between interactive and non-interactive activities by faculty members

Abstract

We develop a model of individual choice in which faculty member maximises a utility function. We find an interior optimum of interactive effort that depends on parameters of theutility function, wage, net revenue from interactive activities, relative weight given to interactive activities in the determination of prestige and knowledge contribution by interactive activities. The model is tested econometrically by using a sample of 380 universityprofessors from the Valencian Community, a Spanish region. Individuals respond to nonmonetaryrather than monetary incentives and to the difficulty of producing non-interactiverather than interactive knowledge. We detect the possible existence of rationing, sinceoptimum effort and real interaction depend on different variables. Policy initiatives may seethe promotion (or disincentive) of university-industry interaction as a medium-long termtarget rather than a short-term one and may be aware of situations arising from rationing.