Conflitos de agência em empresas familiares de capital aberto e a composição do Conselho de Administração

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2020v17n45p19

Palavras-chave:

Conflitos de agência, Empresas familiares, Composição conselho de administração

Resumo

O objetivo do estudo é analisar a influência dos conflitos de agência decorrentes da estrutura de propriedade sobre a presença de membros não familiares no Conselho de Administração das empresas familiares brasileiras de capital aberto. A amostra foi composta por 145 empresas familiares de capital aberto. Coletaram-se os dados nos Formulários de Referência divulgados pelas empresas do ano de 2018, utilizando-se a regressão linear com o método de Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários (MQO) e logística como procedimento de análise de dados. Os resultados apontam que há uma relação negativa entre o conflito principal-principal e a presença de membros não familiares no Conselho de Administração, bem como a relação positiva entre o conflito family blockholder e presença de membros não familiares no Conselho de Administração. Ademais, esse estudo traz como implicação evidências de que a composição do Conselho de Administração é influenciada por conflitos de agência relacionados à estrutura de propriedade das empresas familiares.

Biografia do Autor

Camila Adam

Mestranda em Ciências Contábeis (FURB)

Jules Kout Tene

Mestrando em Ciências Contábeis (FURB)

Daniel Magalhães Mucci, Professor no Departamento de Contabilidade e Atuária (USP)

Doutor em Controladoria e Contabilidade (USP)

Franciele Beck, Professora no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis (FURB)

Doutora em Controladoria e Contabilidade (USP)

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2020-09-28

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