Conflictos de agencia en empresas familiares que cotizan en bolsa y la composición de la Junta Directiva
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2020v17n45p19Resumen
El objetivo del estudio es analizar la influencia de los conflictos de agencia que surgen de la estructura de propiedad sobre la presencia de miembros desconocidos en el Consejo de Administración de empresas familiares brasileñas que cotizan en bolsa. La muestra consistió en 145 empresas familiares que cotizan en bolsa. Los datos se recopilaron en los Formularios de Referencia publicados por las empresas en el año 2018. La regresión lineal utilizando el método de Mínimos Cuadrados Ordinarios (MCO) y la logística se utilizó como un procedimiento de análisis de datos. Los resultados indican que existe una relación negativa entre el conflicto principal-principal y la presencia de miembros no familiares en la Junta de Directores y una relación positiva entre el conflicto family blockholder y la presencia de miembros no familiares en la Junta de Directores. Este estudio implica evidencia de que la composición de la Junta Directiva está influenciada por conflictos de agencia relacionados con la estructura de propiedad de las empresas familiares.
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