Influence of the characteristics of the board of directors in the informal assimetry of companies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2019v16n39p24Abstract
The present research had the objective of analyzing the influence of the characteristics of the board of directors in the informational asymmetry of companies. The methodology was descriptive, documentary and quantitative. The companies analyzed corresponded to the 100 listed in the IBRx100 index of B3 - Brazil, Exchange and Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2016. The data collection was done in the Thomson database and these were analyzed through descriptive statistics and multiple linear regression - OLS. The results revealed the presence of information asymmetry between executives and investors, in which the decrease of such asymmetry was observed, due to the greater size of the board of directors and the independence of the members, besides the size of the company and its profitability. Thus, it was found that the monitoring control of the board of directors to carry out its responsibilities to the symmetry of information and decrease of agency costs needs to present certain characteristics, in which only its implementation does not guarantee this intention. The study has contributed to demonstrate that corporate governance mechanisms such as the board of directors, if projected with quality, can reduce agency problems, and can mitigate external users' concerns about asymmetric information and increase their confidence in the company.
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