The moral problem of abortion

Abstract

The aim of this article is to reflect on the moral problem of abortion, discussing the normative-moral criteria that are generally used in the debate. I begin by analyzing Justice Rosa Weber's vote on the decriminalization of abortion up to the 12th week. Then I present in greater detail the moral problem of abortion and the classic positions of the debate, namely, the conservative or “pro-life” position and the liberal or “pro-choice” position. Then, I present two significant conceptions in the debate, but which use different normative criteria, namely, the position of Judith Jarvis Thomson, who takes the criterion of rights as central, and the position of Rosalind Hursthouse, who uses the normative criterion of virtues. The next step is to propose a distinction between private and public morality, as a way of better understanding the complexity of the problem, identifying only public morality as a legitimate normative source to address the issue of decriminalization of abortion. Finally, I defend the decriminalization of abortion due to the normative asymmetry, in the way that acts of abortion receive a weaker moral blame and from the perspective of public morality, which indicates a point of view that is acceptable to all.