The conflict between morals and politics and the weakness of the will in Kant

Abstract

Kant argues that the steps taken by politics must first pay homage to morals. In Toward Perpetual Peace, he maintains that a possible claim based on the weaknesses of human nature cannot be accepted to neglect the sacred character of the rights of humankind. From this point of view, the article examines, based on the first part of Religion Within the Boundaries of Simple Reason, the treatment given by Kant's moral philosophy to what is generally understood as weakness of the will. At large, the idea of a weakness of the will goes like this: I have the belief or judgment that the right action to do is x, but instead of x, I do y. This idea can also be presented in terms of the famous biblical statement: "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do". The expression weakness of will commonly means a concept whose discussion goes back to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The discussion concerned the meaning of akrasia, commonly translated as incontinence, moral weakness or lack of self-control. I will defend the thesis that the weakness of the will, understood as an attenuation of the Incorporation Thesis, does not receive acceptance in Kant's practical philosophy, and must be understood as a moral vice. Thus, my conclusion will be that the defense in Toward Perpetual Peace that there is no way to objectively sustain any conflict between morals and politics, which must always be subordinated to the former, is in line with the thesis that fragility of human nature must be understood as a degree of evil.