Truth Value and Skepticism in David Hume's Theory of Values
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2025.e94641Keywords:
David Hume, moral value, aesthetic value, cognitivism, skepticismAbstract
In this paper, I present an interpretation about Hume’s theory of moral and aesthetic value. To achieve this aim, after a brief introduction of the matters in question (section 1), I present a comparative analysis of causal and value judgements featured in the literature about the philosopher (2), as well as the main aspects in Hume’s philosophy in favor of the interpretation according to which value judgements have truth value (3). Next, I explain how those common aspects to both types of judgements can be accommodated in this interpretation (4). Finally, I argue that (and how) the described evidences justify the conclusion that value judgements have truth value and constitute a subset of causal judgements, which, in turn, has a skeptical consequence (5).
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