Rule or act utilitarianism in John Stuart Mill

Abstract

This article explores a recurring attempt to associate John Stuart Mill's moral philosophy with rule or act utilitarianism. Both interpretations have explanatory advantages when viewed in face of contemporary utilitarian theories, but they appear to lack bibliographical support when compared with the moral justifications that require an intuitive appeal to the competing approach. We explain the general concepts of both approaches and present Mill's main interpreters: Donner and Miller adhere to the so-called “qualitative hedonism” approach, which has existed since Urmson, thus preferring the rule-utilitarian position; Crisp and Brink, in turn, adhere to the act-utilitarian interpretation because the connection with justice is indifferent to the quality of the pleasures involved. Having outlined these scenarios, we consider that this is not a matter of making an interpretative choice, but of finding the connection between Mill's moral argument and other elements of public life that necessarily conflict with the canonical classification of rule- and act-utilitarianism. We thus attempt to demonstrate an advantage in ignoring the dispute in question and treating it as a natural case for the intuitionism proposed by Mill, with its own advantages.